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Competition is integral to ecology. Community development, for example, is largely
driven by competitive dynamics between individuals (Tilman 2004), and competition
is a primary driver of food web dynamics in
ecosystems (Holt and Polis 1997). And yet,
although competition is at times a biological necessity, and perhaps an evolutionary
imperative, humans (and other species) also
demonstrate a parallel capacity for more cooperative modes of social relation (Fehr and
Fischbacher 2003; Penner et al. 2005). For
example, it is common for humans to share
goods and resources with other humans, and
non-human beings as well, at times (e.g., by
sharing food with pets). However, sharing is
not always easy or intuitive in the context of
human-wildlife relations, particularly when
other species threaten or challenge specific human agendas. Such situations raise
complex ethical questions about proper human conduct toward the environment, and
particularly wildlife. Are humans obligated
to share resources with members of other
species, particularly when doing so requires
some adjustment to established norms and
objectives?
Abstract ethical questions of this
sort take on practical importance in the con-

text of natural resources and wildlife management. In this paper, we consider lethal
management of Double-crested Cormorants
(Phalacrocorax auritus; hereafter, cormorants) in the Great Lakes region of the eastern USA. This issue exemplifies some of the
ways in which ethical questions come to bear
on management decisions. For example,
how should conflict between cormorants
and humans be handled? As highly conspicuous and efficient fishing birds, cormorants have long been viewed as competitors
whose feeding habits threaten valuable commercial and recreational fishery resources
(Wild 2012; Wires 2014). Large colonies of
cormorants also tend to visibly alter the vegetation of their habitat in ways that might
adversely affect other bird and wildlife species, along with scenic or aesthetic qualities
of the landscape enjoyed by humans (Wires
2014). Although formally protected under
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 (U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service 2009), in many
States of the USA, cormorants have been
legally killed under the 1998 Aquaculture
Depredation Order and the 2003 Public
Resource Depredation Order, which, until recently, have permitted the “take” of
cormorants perceived to damage environ-
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mental or economic resources that humans
want or need (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
2003a). These regulations set an important
precedent for the management of not only
cormorants, but fish-eating birds as a group,
since many fish-eating species interact with
resources in ways similar to cormorants.
For years, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service has enacted extensive lethal management activities across the eastern USA,
largely responding to the perception that
cormorant fishing habits threaten human
interests in wild fisheries (U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service 2014a; Wires 2014). Since
the first depredation order was established
in 1998, well over half a million cormorants
and hundreds of thousands of nests and
eggs have been destroyed (U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service 2014a). As of May 2016, following a legal suit filed by Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility (Case
1:14-cv-01807-JBD), the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service was found to be in violation of
the National Environmental Policy Act with
its most recent renewals of the Aquaculture
Depredation Order and the Public Resource
Depredation Order (U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service 2014b). Both orders have since been
suspended, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service was ordered to conduct a “new and
legally adequate” environmental assessment
or environmental impact statement to consider multiple management alternatives.
As the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service initiates this process, it is critical that the agency
take not only relevant scientific, political,
and socioeconomic factors into consideration, but also ethical ones. Despite the magnitude of lethal cormorant management
in the eastern USA, there has to date been
no critical assessment of its ethical appropriateness (Wires 2014). Fortunately, such
challenging ethical issues can be addressed
in a rigorous, systematic manner using established methods of philosophical analysis.
Lethal management of cormorants has been
employed for certain reasons, which can be
constructed formally as arguments. By explicitly formulating and analyzing arguments,
unfounded assumptions, false information,
and inappropriate moral precepts are laid
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open to rational critique. We use argument
analysis to evaluate one highly influential
argument underpinning past and ongoing
proposals for lethal cormorant management
in the Great Lakes region of the USA. The
aims in this paper are twofold: 1) to highlight some of the problematic claims underlying lethal cormorant management in this
region; and 2) to demonstrate the value of
argument analysis as a method to systematically reason through controversial issues in
natural resources and wildlife management.
Methods
Argument analysis has only recently been applied
to natural resources and related fields (Nelson and
Vucetich 2009; Vucetich and Nelson 2017), but it is
well established in philosophical tradition and traces its
roots to Greek antiquity with the birth of formal logic
(Jaquette 2006). In its most basic form, an argument
can be formulated as a set of premises (P) that lead to a
conclusion (C). For example:
P1. All cormorants are black birds.
P2. All black birds eat fish.
C. Therefore, all cormorants eat fish.
Once formulated, the argument can be assessed for
soundness. A sound argument must meet two criteria.
First, the premises must logically entail the conclusion
of the argument. If an argument meets this first criterion, it is valid but not necessarily sound. To be sound the
argument must also meet the second criterion, namely
that all of its premises are true. The argument above
is valid (since, by deductive logic, if we accept both
premises we must also accept the conclusion), but P2 is
clearly untrue, so the argument is not sound. And yet,
we know the conclusion is accurate. This highlights the
important caveat that even if an argument is unsound,
the position it supports is not necessarily wrong. A thorough argument analysis will consider a full spectrum of
arguments to assess whether a given position is rationally justified by any of the arguments made in its defense.
The example above is a relatively simple descriptive
argument. More commonly in natural resources and
wildlife management, people advance normative arguments (i.e., arguments that are prescriptive, rather than
descriptive). Normative arguments must contain at least
one normative premise to be valid. A normative premise
might explicitly state how things “should” or “ought to”
be, but it may take other forms as well (e.g., by asserting
notions of good or bad, right or wrong, justice, or value).
When stated in these latter forms, we might consider the
premise not only normative but also distinctly ethical.
A set of exclusively descriptive premises does not
logically entail a normative conclusion, since what “is”
observed does not on its own suggest what “ought” to
be (Hume 2000). For example, it is impossible to argue:

200

Waterbirds

P1. Cormorants are black birds. (descriptive)
C. Therefore, we should kill cormorants. (normative)
The argument requires an additional normative
premise:
P1. Cormorants are black birds. (descriptive)
P2. We should kill all black birds. (normative)
C. Therefore, we should kill cormorants. (normative)
Now the chain of inference is valid, since the two
premises necessarily entail the conclusion. However,
we still must evaluate the premises for truth. Assessing
the “truth” of normative premises can be more challenging than assessing the truth of descriptive premises, which are often scientifically and empirically verifiable. We generally try to evaluate whether a normative
premise is “appropriate” rather than true. Though
sometimes complex and highly controversial, judgments of appropriateness can in many cases be made
simply by referring to common morality, or even common sense. For example, the unqualified assertion “we
should kill all black birds” would be justifiable only on
grounds of superstition or intolerance, neither generally accepted as a basis for a moral position, at least
in contemporary Western society. Therefore, P2 can
be considered inappropriate, rendering the argument
unsound.
Prior to analysis, arguments must first be identified and selected, a process that can be carried out
in different ways. For example, Jager et al. (2016)
used relevant media coverage to identify and analyze arguments for and against management of Mute
Swans (Cygnus olor) in Michigan, USA. For the present analysis, we relied on a small group of colleagues
with expertise and experience in cormorant management in the USA. With these colleagues, we compiled
a table of the most influential reasons people use to
support or oppose lethal management of cormorants

(Table 1). To conduct a thorough analysis, each reason in Table 1 could be formulated and evaluated
as a separate argument. Here, we analyze one set of
arguments, which generally state that lethal management should be used because cormorant populations
threaten valuable goods and resources, including
wild fisheries, aquaculture, and ecosystem health.
Since space prevents us from analyzing arguments in
each of these contexts, we focus on wild fisheries, a
central and long-standing locus of conflict between
humans and cormorants in the Great Lakes region of
the USA (Wires 2014).

Results
We identified three versions of the wild
fisheries argument, each ethically distinguishable from the others in subtle but important ways. The first version can be formulated as follows:
P1. Wildlife that impede humans from
satisfying their preferences are nuisances.
P2. Cormorants impede humans from
satisfying their preferences in wild
fisheries.
C1. Therefore, cormorants are nuisances.
P3. To allow humans to satisfy their preferences, wildlife nuisances should be
controlled by whichever means are
most practical and effective.

Table 1. Reasons for and against lethal management of Double-crested Cormorants in the Great Lakes region, USA.
Reasons were developed by a small group of experts who specialize in the study of Double-crested Cormorants,
and are based on their collective experience with lethal management of these birds in the USA.
Reasons for Lethal Management

Reasons against Lethal Management

Lethal management of cormorants protects goods
enjoyed by humans (wild fisheries, aquaculture,
ecosystem health)
Cormorants are greedy or voracious

Lethal management of cormorants will have negative impacts on ecosystems

Cormorants are invasive or destructive
Lethal management of cormorants imparts a sense
of control over fish stock losses
Cormorants are appropriate targets for hunting
Cormorants exceed human tolerance levels (social, cultural, or wildlife carrying capacity)
Lethal management will not compromise population viability
Lethal management is the only way to handle human-wildlife conflict
Lethal management is necessary to appease certain
social sectors

Cormorants are living creatures, worthy of moral
consideration
Cormorants are a natural part of the ecosystem
Cormorants are not responsible for fish stock losses
- it is unjust to blame them, and a distraction from
the real issue
Lethal management of cormorants is ineffective
Slippery slope: lethal management sets a precedent
that risks undermining other environmental laws
The outcome of lethal management is uncertain
and runs contrary to the precautionary principle
There are other ways to resolve human-wildlife conflict
There is no good reason to use lethal management
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P4. Lethal management is the most practical and effective means for controlling cormorants.
C2. Therefore, cormorants should be
controlled by lethal management.
P1 and P3 situate this argument in a narrow anthropocentric, utilitarian worldview.
Based on the metaphysical belief that humans are categorically distinct from and
superior to all other types of beings, the
narrow anthropocentric view presumes that
nonhuman beings, including wildlife, are
valuable only to the extent that they satisfy
human preferences (Norton 1984; Goralnik and Nelson 2012). Following from this
view, narrow anthropocentrism assumes humans are justified in using wildlife in whichever way maximizes human welfare. On this
view, it is appropriate to sustain or promote
wildlife populations that have some utility
value for humans, but it is also appropriate
to control or even eradicate wildlife populations that have no such utility value, particularly when they actively prevent humans
from enjoying the utility value of other
goods or resources.
Narrow anthropocentrism has been
widely rejected as a basis for management,
being linked to extractive and exploitative
use of wildlife and natural resources (White
1967; Callicott 1990; Norton 1992). It has
also been critiqued philosophically for being predicated on flawed assumptions that
only humans possess certain characteristics,
such as sentience, consciousness, or rationality, which are used as markers of human superiority over other types of beings (Routley
and Routley 1979). With the recognition that
some nonhuman beings possess these same
characteristics (and some human beings do
not possess these characteristics), environmental ethicists argue that it is arbitrary and
rationally inconsistent to elevate humans categorically above nonhumans, or at least those
who possess the characteristics in question
(Routley and Routley 1979). Others still have
criticized the choice of characteristics themselves as human-biased, socially constructed,
and rationally indefensible criteria for moral
standing (Taylor 1981; Plumwood 1993).
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Although there is wide recognition in
the scholarly community that narrow anthropocentrism is environmentally damaging, philosophically untenable, and ethically
inappropriate, it remains influential as a
normative basis for wildlife management, including lethal management of cormorants in
the eastern USA. People in the Lake Champlain region of the USA, for example, have
expressed preferences for less abundant cormorant populations, regarding the birds, at
observed population levels, as pests (Kuentzel et al. 2012). These attitudes are associated
with perceived competition between cormorants and anglers, and also linked to support
for lethal management activities (Kuentzel et
al. 2012).
The second version of the wild fisheries argument exemplifies a broader form
of anthropocentrism than the first, by acknowledging a spectrum of human benefits
beyond purely economic or utility values
(Norton 1984; Goralnik and Nelson 2012).
This version of the argument can be formulated as follows:
P1. Wild fisheries provide benefits for humans.
P2. Cormorant populations also provide
benefits for humans.
P3. Cormorant predation compromises
the benefits wild fisheries provide for
humans.
P4. Wildlife management should sustain
all the benefits that wildlife provide
for humans.
P5. Using lethal management to control
cormorant predation sustains the
benefits that both wild fisheries and
cormorant populations provide for
humans.
C. Therefore, lethal management should
be used to control cormorant predation.
The broad anthropocentric view, advanced decades ago by environmental
ethicist Bryan Norton (Norton 1991), has
become influential of late in the prevalent
ecosystem services framework for management and conservation, which expands the
notion of a human “benefit” to include
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indirect or intangible goods that are supported by ecosystem processes and functions (Costanza et al. 2017). In many cases,
lethal management of cormorants has been
informed by a similarly expansive sense of
human benefits. For example, the environmental assessment conducted by the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Department in the state
of Michigan, USA, notes, “Wildlife populations provide a range of social and economic benefits… related to consumptive and
non-consumptive use” (U.S. Department
of Agriculture 2011). With the understanding that cormorants do have value for some
people, even if their particular type of value
(e.g., cultural or existence value) cannot
be reduced to a utility or preference, lethal
management has been framed as an effort
to balance the multiple values of wildlife for
humans.
As stated in P5, lethal management to
control cormorant populations may protect the benefits humans derive from both
fisheries and cormorants if we assume the
particular types of values associated with cormorants would still be provided by less abundant populations. If this is true, and if we
accept the broad anthropocentric stance adopted in P4, the conclusion here may be justified. However, this version of the argument
neglects the possibility that the cormorants
being culled may also have value in themselves. If broad anthropocentrism avoids
some of the practical problems (i.e., exploitation and resource degradation) linked to
the narrower anthropocentric stance (White
1967; Norton 1991), it still posits human
beings and their interests as the measure
of all value in the world. As such, it can be
critiqued on the philosophical and ethical
grounds of arbitrariness, inconsistency, and
inappropriateness noted above.
Against anthropocentrism, many in the
scholarly community have argued that wildlife, either individually or collectively, also
possess inherent value (i.e., value for their
own sake) (Taylor 1981; Agar 2001; Smith
2016). Inherent value, in turn, is used as a
basis for the argument that wildlife ought to
be granted direct moral standing, obligating
humans, as moral agents, to view and treat

them as more than instrumental means to
human ends (Taylor 1981; Rolston 1988). If
these arguments are sound, a claim like P4
suggesting wildlife should be managed only
for and as human benefits, without considering their inherent value, would be ethically
inappropriate. This leads to a third version
of the wild fisheries argument, which can be
formulated as follows:
P1. Cormorant predation on commercial/recreational fish stocks competes with human interests, generating conflict between cormorants and
humans.
P2. Conflict between cormorants and humans should be reduced.
P3. Lethal management will reduce cormorant predation on commercial/
recreational fish stocks.
P4. Reducing cormorant predation on
commercial/recreational fish stocks
will reduce conflict between cormorants and humans.
C1. Therefore, lethal management will
reduce conflict between cormorants
and humans.
P5. Lethal management entails intentionally killing cormorants.
P6. As living beings with inherent value,
cormorants should not be intentionally killed without justification.
P7. Reducing conflict between cormorants and humans justifies intentionally killing cormorants.
C2. Therefore, cormorants should be intentionally killed to reduce conflict
between cormorants and humans.
Before addressing the ethical premises of
this third version of the argument, we briefly
comment on the empirical premises, since
they also bear on the soundness of the argument.
The claim made in P1 (which also appeared, in slightly different forms, in P2 of
the first version and P3 of the second version
of the argument) is contested. Wires (2014)
summarizes a large body of research on the
impacts of cormorant predation on highvalue fishery stocks. Most evidence indicates
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that cormorants do not primarily feed on fish
species that are valued by anglers and commercial fishermen or fisherwomen (Diana et
al. 2006; Dalton et al. 2009). But cormorants
are also widely considered generalist and opportunistic feeders (Wires 2014), adapting
to geographic and seasonal fluctuations in
prey, which might sometimes include fish
valued by anglers and commercial fishermen
or fisherwomen (Lantry et al. 2002; Rudstam
et al. 2004; Fielder 2008). Thus, we cannot at
present say with certainty whether or under
what circumstances P1 is true or not true. It is
certainly true, however, that cormorant predation is perceived to compete with human
interests, and this perceived competition
has indeed contributed to conflict between
cormorants and humans in the eastern USA
(Kuentzel et al. 2012; Wires 2014). Proceeding to P3, there is evidence associating lethal
management of cormorants with recovery in
valued fish populations (Fielder 2010; Schultz et al. 2013; Johnson et al. 2015). However,
these findings are context-specific, and the
research has been critiqued for the presence of confounding variables and study design biases (Diana 2010; Schultz et al. 2013;
Johnson et al. 2015). Therefore, the truth
of P3 also remains unclear. The last empirical premise that merits commentary is P4
(since P5 is a non-controversial statement of
fact). In the growing body of work on human-wildlife conflict (Seoraj-Pillai and Pillay
2017), researchers have found that conflict
does not necessarily dissipate once damages caused by wildlife, or perceived to be
caused by wildlife, have ceased (Dickman
2010). Drivers of human conflicts with cormorants, and wildlife in general, are many
and complex (Dickman 2010). Conflict
with cormorants in the Great Lakes region
of the USA, for example, is proximately related to perceived competition over wild
fisheries, but there is also a long history of
superstition around and intolerance toward
cormorants, neither of which is necessarily
based on cormorant predation habits per se
(Wires 2014). Therefore, the initial conclusion (C1) that reducing predation-related
competition will also reduce conflict may
not be supported.
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Turning now to the ethical premises, P6
marks the most obvious divergence from
previous versions of the argument. P6 expresses a claim about the inherent value of
cormorants that can be found in both the
Final Environmental Impact Statement and
the Final Rule for the 2003 Public Resource
Depredation Order (U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service 2003a, 2003b). The premise here expresses a biocentric perspective attributing
inherent value to cormorants as living beings (Goralnik and Nelson 2012), but could
also be expressed from a zoocentric perspective attributing inherent value to cormorants
as sentient animals.
The important point to note is that,
whether as sentient animals or as living beings, cormorants are recognized as ends in
themselves, whose value extends beyond any
value they provide for humans. From this
follows the reasonable and generally noncontroversial ethical claim that entities with
inherent value should only be killed if there
is good reason to do so.
P7 cites conflict reduction as justification
for intentionally killing cormorants. Ethicists call this sort of claim “consequentialist,”
in the sense that it appeals to the outcomes,
or consequences, of an act (in this case, lethal management) to judge whether the act
is right or wrong (Sinnott-Armstrong 2015).
In the context of the argument, for justification P7 relies on P2 before it, which established conflict reduction as a worthy outcome. With broad consensus that resolution
or at least mitigation of human-wildlife conflict is a desirable goal (Treves et al. 2009), P2
can be considered appropriate in a general
sense. However, even a worthy end may not
justify any means used to achieve it (Nelson
et al. 2016). As such, establishing conflict reduction as a worthy end, in P2, does not, on
its own, justify the more specific, comparative claim that its value as an end supersedes
the inherent value of the cormorants sacrificed in efforts to reduce conflict.
Justifying P7 requires us to weigh the relative benefits of conflict resolution against the
costs, and particularly the costs in cormorant
lives. Assessments of this sort, which seek to
compare values measured on different scales
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(if measurable at all), are challenging, and
their accuracy is a matter of some debate
(Spash 2000; Gómez-Baggethun et al. 2010).
But P7 can also be evaluated conceptually
by more closely examining the meaning of
“conflict,” as it is being used here. In the
human-wildlife context, “conflict” has been
defined in different ways, but most commonly refers to damages caused by wildlife
to human goods or resources (Peterson et
al. 2010). Conflict, in this sense, is defined
specifically from the perspective of humans
(i.e., it is anthropocentric). At first glance,
this connotation of “anthropocentric” may
appear to be non-problematic; indeed, to
the extent that we can only live and experience from our own human perspective, it is
impossible for us to be anything but anthropocentric (Goralnik and Nelson 2012). However, conflict is not only being defined from
the human perspective in this ontologically
anthropocentric sense, but also relative to
and, critically, in the service of human values
and interests in an ethically anthropocentric
sense (Goralnik and Nelson 2012). To understand why this is the case, consider for a
moment how “conflict” would be defined if
we were to adopt a cormorant’s perspective.
As generalists, cormorants are relatively flexible and can adapt to prey availability, or lack
thereof, if and as it fluctuates with human
fishing operations (Wires 2014). As such, for
cormorants “conflict” is not directly related
to resource limitations as it is for humans in
the Great Lakes region of the USA. Instead,
conflict, as a cormorant might view it, arises
out of the hazing, egg oiling, nest disruption, and shooting that, until recently, have
been widely enacted to control their populations. It is striking to notice that alleviating
conflict, as viewed from a human perspective, actually causes and perpetuates conflict,
as viewed from a cormorant perspective. It is
also important to note that the benefits of lethal management accrue entirely to humans,
while costs are born entirely by cormorants.
Therefore, even were it demonstrated, in a
quantitative sense, that the net benefits of lethal management and conflict resolution exceed net costs, the distribution of costs and
benefits is overwhelmingly skewed to favor

human interests. If cormorants were regarded and valued not merely as means, but also
as ends in themselves, their interests could
not, in good conscience, be so completely
overlooked.
As such, P6 either misinterprets the
meaning and implications of “inherent value” or invokes it as a rhetorical tool to deflect
criticism from certain social sectors. Either
way, this analysis suggests P6 can best be explained as a spurious non-anthropocentric
premise in an otherwise anthropocentric argument for lethal management.
Discussion
This analysis, which examined three
slightly different arguments supporting cormorant management in the eastern USA,
demonstrates that all three arguments are
predicated on an anthropocentric ethical
position, which has been broadly refuted on
philosophical and, in some cases, practical
grounds. We suggest lethal control of cormorants, or any wildlife population, predicated
on anthropocentric claims or propositions is
not ethically appropriate and should not be
accepted as a sound basis for ongoing lethal
management activities.
It could be argued that we formulated
these arguments specifically to represent
an anthropocentric stance. There is indeed
some discretion in the precise wording and
structure of the arguments presented in this
paper, and certainly we acknowledge that
our own values informed the interpretation
of the arguments presented herein. We do
not support the extensive program of lethal
management that has been enacted across
the eastern USA for many years, in part because we feel it rests on infirm anthropocentric ethical foundations. However, we also
point to evidence in the extent and extremity of lethal management that suggests our
representation of these arguments, and our
claim that the inherent value of cormorants
has not genuinely been taken into consideration, are defensible.
For example, as ruled by the District
of Columbia District Court in 2016 (Case
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1:14-cv-01807-JBD), the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has failed to take the requisite
“hard look” at impacts of lethal management on cormorants, as mandated under
the National Environmental Policy Act (U.S.
Office of NEPA Policy and Compliance
2017). If managing agencies have neglected
their legal imperative to seriously consider
the interests of cormorants, it seems unlikely
that they recognize a parallel moral imperative to do the same. The magnitude of cormorant management across the eastern USA
is also telling. Over 500,000 cormorants were
legally killed between 1999 and 2012, as permitted by Federal order (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 2014a). Assuming yearly averages
remained more or less constant from 20132015, this figure now likely exceeds 600,000
(U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 2014a), even
without accounting for other methods of
cormorant harassment and control, such
as nest destruction and egg oiling. We can
also consider how targets have been set for
lethal management. At the national level,
the Final Environmental Impact Statement
for the 2003 Public Resource Depredation
Order proposed that roughly 8% of the U.S.
population of cormorants would be killed,
approximately 160,000 individuals (U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service 2003b). These
targets were calculated based on records of
cormorant depredation permits issued historically, prior to the Public Resource Depredation Order (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
2003b). Although this target certainly reflects public perceptions of cormorant predation and its effects on fishery stocks, which
may or may not be accurate, it is not clearly
based on scientifically informed estimates of
the number of cormorants that would actually need to be removed to achieve recovery
objectives for fisheries. Targets defined at
the State level are also revealing. The environmental assessment for cormorant management in the State of Michigan, USA, for
example, dictates that a minimum of 5,000
breeding pairs of cormorants should be
maintained statewide, a figure calculated to
ensure overall cormorant population viability, and that no more than 15,500 cormorants
may be killed in a given year (U.S. Depart-
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ment of Agriculture 2011). Management targets, in other words, prescribe the maximum
number of cormorants that can be killed,
rather than the minimum number that must
be killed, to achieve defined fisheries objectives. This would be unfathomable as a rubric
for governance of human societies or mitigation of inter-human conflicts. We suggest
the calculation of management targets, and
the thought processes underpinning them,
would be radically different if the inherent
value of cormorants was truly recognized.
Cormorants are currently experiencing a
population resurgence bringing them close
to historic abundances (Wires and Cuthbert
2006), and could probably remain viable
even at lower local and national population
levels. Thus, the persistence of the species is
not immediately at stake in deciding whether or not to continue lethal management.
We suggest the more pressing issue is whether, in killing cormorants to eradicate competition (or perceived competition) with humans, we are appropriately sharing common
resources. Just as humans, individually and
as societies, decide when and how to share
with other humans, so too must we decide
when and how we are obligated to share with
non-human entities, including cormorants.
There are unfortunately no simple rules to
guide such challenging moral decisions, and
many questions remain to be explored as we
consider what it means (ecologically, socially, and philosophically) for humans to share
the earth’s resources with other life forms.
For now, the more basic point we hope to
emphasize is that the ability, and at times
imperative, to share should not be restricted
by default to inter-human relations. Instead,
perhaps we ought to begin with the assumption that we are morally obligated to share
with non-humans, like cormorants, and that
therefore we should share with non-humans
unless there is a sound reason not to do so.
We focused primarily on only one set of
arguments here, but the reasons listed in Table 1 raise other interesting and important
ethical questions as well. Examples include
how to appropriately balance the wellbeing
of individual entities with the good of the
collective ecosystem (Vucetich and Nelson
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2007), and to what extent humans should respect or uphold the “naturalness” of ecological systems (Anderson 1991). Particularly,
as the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service begins
to develop and assess management alternatives, we recommend argument analysis as a
way to structure thorough assessment of not
only the scientific but also the ethical underpinnings and implications of different proposals. Having analyzed only one argument
in this paper, we cannot rule out the possibility that lethal cormorant management in the
eastern USA may be supported by a different
argument or set of arguments. However, if
ongoing proposals for lethal management
are in fact being supported solely or primarily by the arguments examined in this paper,
we suggest there is good reason for the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service to seriously reconsider reinstating any broad scale program
of lethal cormorant management unless or
until it is justified by an alternative line of
reasoning that is both scientifically and ethically sound.
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